New York, 12 November 2014  
Check Against Delivery  

General Assembly  

Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters  
Statement by H.E. Ambassador Christian Wenaweser  
Permanent Representative of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the United Nations  

Mr. President,

As the United Nations approaches its 70th anniversary, the system of international peace and security created by the Charter is still very much at the heart of the international order. When crises erupt – in Syria, Ukraine, the Central African Republic or elsewhere – the international community looks to the Security Council, the centerpiece of the Charter’s system of collective security, for leadership and guidance. The powers the Security Council enjoys under the Charter are unique, leading to great expectations on the part of the international community. All too often, they are disappointed. By failing to take a decisive role in conflicts such as in Syria and Ukraine, the Security Council risks losing its central role and creating the impression that it is only suitable to effectively address crises where Permanent Members do not feel they have a national stake.

World leaders recognized the necessity to reform the Security Council when they met in 2005
for the World Summit and supported “early reform” of the Security Council, committing themselves “to continuing [their] efforts to achieve a decision to this end.” We have not come any closer to reforming the Security Council since then. This is not for want of proposals, but for want of genuine engagement. With so much at stake and with no understanding of a timeline, no clear process, delegations find it easier to endlessly repeat their well-known positions than to signal concessions that would allow moving the process forward.

Mr. President,

In terms of concrete proposals for the expansion of the Security Council, my delegation stands by a model that offers a viable middle ground between the two most extreme positions. This model which we presented as a full-fledged proposal in 2012 would add a category of long-term elected seats to the Council, with terms of for eight or ten years. States in this new category of seats would be allowed to stand for immediate re-election. We also proposed a so-called “flip-flop clause” under which States that unsuccessfully sought election for the longer-term seats would be barred from standing for election for the existing, 2-year seats for the duration of what would have been their term of office. A mandatory review of the mechanism would take place after two terms of the new, long-term seats.

This is an “intermediate” approach to the extent that it seeks to bridge the gap between those who favor expansion in the two existing categories and those who want to expand the number of non-permanent seats only. But it is not meant to be a transition to a particular final outcome. Much rather, it is a viable model in its own right, albeit with the possibility of further change as part of a review after 20 years or so. We remain convinced that such an intermediate approach is the only viable option expansion of the Security Council, both as far as acceptance here in the General Assembly and in the necessary ratification process. Moreover, we are deeply skeptical that the addition of more veto-wielding permanent members would truly make the Security Council a more effective institution – and are of the view that many others in this organization

1 A/RES/60/1, paragraph 153.
Mr. President,

Anyone unfortunate enough to sit through sessions of the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform (IGN) will hear much of the desirability of a “comprehensive solution” and the repugnancy of a “piecemeal approach.” We certainly agree that amending the Charter is an enormous task and that we have to produce a package covering all aspects of Council reform. It is precisely these amendments that the IGN is supposed to negotiate. However, it is quite preposterous to use this as a pretext to not call on the Security Council to immediately take what measures it can to become more transparent, more accountable and more effective, in line with the decision of the Summit Outcome almost ten years ago. The practice of the Council is evolving and it makes adjustments to new challenges it faces – while many of us would like to see much more of that. Using enlargement as a pretext to not promote this type of improvements is clearly counterproductive.

I am thinking here in particular of efforts towards a code of conduct that would limit the use of the veto in situations involving atrocity crimes. Such an agreement requires no Charter amendment, nor indeed any action by the General Assembly at all. Why should the agreement on such a code of conduct have to wait until we agree how to expand the Council? The same can be said for issues related to the working methods of the Security Council more generally. While it is true that Working Methods is one of the clusters of Security Council reform in General Assembly Decision 62/557, it is clear that this was meant to pertain to working methods of an expanded Security Council – and nothing else. Decision 62/557 is not a roadblock to practical measures that would make the Security Council a more effective organ even prior to its eventual expansion – and it should not be interpreted as such.
As we ponder how to move the Security Council reform process forward, we cannot see the utility of simply going through the motions in the IGN as we did for the last five years. Last year’s report of the Advisory Group to John Ashe, President of the 68th session of the General Assembly, gives us a solid summary of all of the negotiating positions. The time has come to either try something new, or to put the IGN to rest.

What would meaningful progress look like? The appointment of an IGN Chair is a start, and we wish Ambassador Rattray every success in this difficult endeavor. We hope that he will take the leadership role traditionally accorded to those who lead negotiations on behalf of the President of the General Assembly. This is how every other membership-driven negotiation in this building works and we do not see why this one should be any different. Before we begin the IGN, we would also like to see an assessment from the Chair as to the results he feels attainable in the current session of the Assembly. This would give us a yardstick whereby to measure our progress.

We stand ready to work with you, Mr. President, and the Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations to make meaningful progress in this session.

I thank you.